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Abstract—Internet of Things devices are envisioned to pene-
trate essentially all aspects of life, including homes and urban
spaces, in use cases such as health care, assisted living, and
smart cities. One often proposed solution for dealing with the
massive amount of data collected by these devices and offering
services on top of them is the federation of the Internet of
Things and cloud computing. However, user acceptance of
such systems is a critical factor that hinders the adoption
of this promising approach due to severe privacy concerns.
We present UPECSI, an approach for user-driven privacy
enforcement for cloud-based services in the Internet of Things
to address this critical factor. UPECSI enables enforcement
of all privacy requirements of the user once her sensitive
data leaves the border of her network, provides a novel
approach for the integration of privacy functionality into the
development process of cloud-based services, and offers the
user an adaptable and transparent configuration of her privacy
requirements. Hence, UPECSI demonstrates an approach for
realizing user-accepted cloud services in the Internet of Things.
Keywords-Internet of Things, Cloud Computing, Privacy,
Model-driven, User-acceptance, Services, Development
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the vision of intercon-
necting an incredible large amount of smart things (IoT
devices), making its way into almost all aspects of everyday
life. Typical examples for the envisioned deployment of
IoT systems for end-users include, but are not limited to,
pervasive health care, assisted living, and smart cities [1],
[2]. IoT devices are often constrained in their computational
and storage resources and might be powered by a battery.
Additionally, they may be mobile or loose connectivity
and hence cannot be assumed to be always available. To
overcome these constraints, it seems natural to leverage the
elastic and always available resources of the cloud [3]–[7].
Cloud solutions simplify storage and processing of collected
data, usage of same data within several services, as well as
combining data of several users and supporting user mobility
without information fragmentation over several databases.
While necessary sensors and cloud solutions already exist
today, user acceptance of such a comprehensive solution
remains a critical factor [2], [8]–[10]. Especially, a user’s
privacy could be subject to a wide range of threats, notably
for a widely deployed system. Hence, it is crucial to ensure
users’ data control – optionally being able to rate, e.g., in the
context of pervasive health care, health higher than privacy
in an emergency. This is only possible by anchoring privacy
aspects within the system itself, oriented at users’ demands.
As an IoT device usually is not custom made for a specific
user, but a product for a whole group, privacy demands can
not be hard-coded into the product. Instead, privacy choices
have to be left to the user. This increases complexity during
the design and development of IoT services. Additionally,
they put a burden on the user who is often not aware of the
(technical) consequences of her choices.
In order to overcome these issues, we present UPECSI,
our envisioned solution for User-driven Privacy Enforcement
for Cloud-based Services in the IoT. Specifically, with
UPECSI, we make the following contributions: i) enforce-
ment of a user’s privacy requirements even if her sensitive
data leaves the secured borders of her own IoT network, ii) a
novel approach for integrating privacy functionality into the
development of cloud-based services, and iii) an adaptable,
flexible, simple, and transparent possibility for a user to
configure her privacy settings. With these contributions,
we lay the foundations for bringing the IoT and cloud
computing together with a user-driven approach for privacy-
enabled service development in a cloud-based system.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First,
in Section II we describe the use cases and network scenario
of our approach. Then, we discuss privacy concerns of end-
users and privacy considerations of service providers in such
a scenario in Section III. This is followed by a discussion
of related work in Section IV. In Section V, we present
the main contribution of this paper, our envisioned UPECSI
architecture. We conclude our paper in Section VI and give
an outlook to the next steps of realizing UPECSI.
II. SCENARIO
In this section, we provide an overview of our envisioned
scenario, i.e., exemplary use cases as well as the network
scenario from both a societal and technical point of view. We
motivate and discuss the design of UPECSI in the contexts
of assisted living and interactive assistance in public spaces.
A. Use Cases
In the first use case, assisted living, we consider a 75-
years-old widowed female retiree who appreciates living
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Figure 1. Each user (U) operates one or more networks of IoT devices (D) sending data to the cloud over a gateway (GW). The cloud stores data in
different databases and provides it to user-authorized services (S), as well as emergency services (ES), which are provided by service developers (SD).
independently in her apartment. A number of unobtrusive
sensors screen her vital signs and deliver information to the
cloud for fast access, e.g., by family members and third
parties such as doctors and health care providers. In the
second context, we consider this lady being comfortable with
seamlessly taking UPECSI with her on her portable and/or
wearable devices, where it takes a proactive role to provide
assistance in public spaces. Easing the management of data
and services in both contexts, the user is assisted by UPECSI
as an easy-to-use interface to the whole cloud-based system.
These use cases are influenced by social forces such as
aging (western) societies and the therefore increasing role
of technology in supporting formal and informal care/assis-
tance. Furthermore, they do not only reflect general societal
processes of differentiation, singularization, and changing
gender roles, but are particularly prevalent when studying
the changing social structure of older life [11]. Hence, they
serve as adequate examples to derive design requirements for
UPECSI to be user-accepted and provide us with a promising
evaluation setting. However, the technical foundations of
UPECSI are applicable to much broader contexts ranging
from building management systems over intelligent trans-
portation systems to smart manufacturing.
B. Network Scenario
From a technical perspective, we depict our assumed
network scenario in Figure 1. Each user (U) operates one
or more networks of IoT devices (D), e.g., a body network
consisting of unobtrusive health care devices as well as a
home network containing assisted living devices. Each of
these networks is connected to the cloud over a dedicated
gateway (GW) device. All devices (and hence networks)
of a user form her privacy sphere, i.e., she has a certain
trust into components within this sphere but does not want
any potentially sensitive information collected in this sphere
to be unrestrictedly available to third parties. Data that is
sensed in one of the networks is forwarded via the gateway
to the cloud. There, it is stored persistently and can be
accessed by services (S) and emergency services (ES). Note
that we assume a large number of users to participate in this
setting, leading to a multi-tenancy scenario. These services
are offered by service developers (SD) who usually follow
business interests and implement the functionality along with
supporting functions such as billing or scaling with load.
III. PRIVACY CONCERNS AND CONSIDERATIONS
In order to realize a scenario as described above, where
potentially sensitive data from IoT devices is outsourced to
the cloud, various privacy aspects have to be considered. We
divide our discussion of these aspects in privacy concerns of
end-users and privacy considerations of service providers.
A. Privacy Concerns of End-users
Data sensed by IoT devices often contains sensitive infor-
mation that others might be interested in [2]. For example,
data from a pervasive health care and assisted living system
might prove to be valuable for insurance companies in order
to increase a person’s fee or even deny a new contract.
Additionally, not only the sensed data itself but also cor-
responding meta information (e.g., location or time) might
be considered sensitive [12]. Thus, users often refrain from
revealing the readings of their IoT devices to third parties.
Even more privacy concerns and issues arise when out-
sourcing this data to the cloud. For end-users, the major
concern is the perceived loss of control over data if it is
outsourced to the cloud [9], [10]. This mainly results from
the fact that there is no control or at least transparency over
the access to this data and, hence, data might be handed over
to third parties or misused for unintended purposes [10].
Due to these concerns, end-users tend to refrain from using
cloud-based services for (highly) sensitive data.
On a more general scale, an empirical study [13] showed
that people expect a reasonable protection of their data, that
legislation is adhered to, and that they are being informed
about when and for what purpose their data is used. Addi-
tionally, privacy is not a fixed norm. Users are willing to
trade-in privacy, e.g., for health in case of emergencies or
quality of life in a nursing home [14]. This emphasizes the
importance of including the user within privacy research,
especially by providing transparency.
B. Privacy Considerations of Service Providers
From a service provider’s point of view, ignoring the
previously depicted concerns can lead to undesired con-
sequences, ranging from the nonacceptance of a service
to costly lawsuits [2], [15]. Furthermore, especially when
providing cloud services, legal restrictions, e.g., regarding
the storage location and duration of data, have to be ad-
dressed [10], [15]. Particularly for legal requirements, ser-
vice providers often need support from cloud providers [10].
In order to satisfy the user demand for transparency, the
service provider has to lay out all uses of customer data.
Nowadays, these descriptions are developed by lawyers, who
have to interview the developers in order to get information
about the processed data. As human communication is error
prone, these descriptions are often formulated very defen-
sive, so that lawsuits filed by users will not be successful
even if the data handling deviates from the developer-
intended behavior [16]. This lack of precise, up-to-date
information about the data processing leads to uncertainty
and non-transparency for the user.
IV. RELATED WORK
Securely outsourcing data, which is collected by small
devices, to the cloud has already been proposed by related
work. For example, Lounis et al. [17] provide a secure cloud-
based solution for health care data, while the SensorCloud
project [3]–[5], [7], [18], [19] aims at providing a secure
infrastructure for realizing services which operate on all
kinds of sensor data. Although these approaches focus
on security aspects, they do not address privacy concerns
beyond providing confidentiality and access control.
In both domains, IoT and cloud computing, solutions for
preserving privacy have been proposed. Examples for the
IoT domain include the privacy-preserving computation of
statistical values on health care data [20] and a context-aware
system for assisted living and residential monitoring [21]. To
ensure privacy in cloud computing, solutions ranging from
annotating data with fine-grained privacy obligations [10]
to using tamper-proof hardware components for realizing
privacy-aware data storage and processing [22] have been
proposed. Although these approaches present techniques for
preserving privacy in the IoT and the cloud, we are not
aware of a comprehensive approach for providing privacy in
the combination of the two to support users and developers
in using or, resp., designing services in a privacy-aware way.
In order to express privacy requirements, several ap-
proaches have been proposed [23]–[26]. Notably, the
SPARCLE Workbench [27] transforms privacy policies from
natural language to XACML [28] and back. This is shown
to be useful for policy makers, auditors, and managers [29]
but not for service developers, as these need a compact and
comprehensive language, which adopts known concepts of
their domain [30]. All these approaches can describe data
handling policies, but only some enable user choice, and
none is integrated with IoT/cloud service development.
Hence, related work provides valuable insights and build-
ing blocks, but in order to fully address the privacy con-
cerns and considerations as discussed in Section III when
combining IoT and cloud computing, additional effort is
required. For this, it is crucial to focus on both the users
and developers of an IoT/cloud service.
V. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
To address these privacy concerns, we present the design
of UPECSI, our system for user-driven privacy enforcement
for cloud-based services in the IoT. The agreed require-
ments for privacy enforcement are notice, consent, self-
determination, adequate security, and purposeful use [15].
Notice, consent, and self-determination can be achieved by
interacting with the user and thus providing transparency,
while adequate security and purposeful use can be achieved
through technical measures.
In order to realize UPECSI, we identify the following
three core aspects: i) Privacy Enforcement Points, which
are situated on the network gateways and allow the user
to enforce her security and privacy requirements beyond the
networks she physically controls, ii) Model-driven Privacy,
which eases the integration of privacy functionality into
service development, and iii) Interaction with the User to
provide transparency. Figure 2 gives a high-level overview of
UPECSI by illustrating these core aspects and their interplay.
First, the Privacy Enforcement Points (PEP) allow the user
to protect access to her data and hence guarantee adequate
security and consent. Second, using Model-driven Privacy,
a service-specific privacy policy (PP) can automatically be
derived. The service’s realization and data usage monitoring
(M) is audited by a trusted third-party (TTP) using audit
information (A) to guarantee purposeful use and notice. The
audited policy, together with a default privacy configuration
(PC) recommended by a trusted third-party, is provided to
the user on her interface (I). There, to provide consent, she
makes the final decision if and under which conditions she
grants a service access to her data. In the following, we
discuss the aspects of UPECSI in more detail.
A. Privacy Enforcement Points
As we have shown in Section II, a network of IoT devices
is connected to the cloud via a gateway. Additionally, a
user might operate more than one network of IoT devices
and hence more than one gateway. We observe, that these
gateways are the distinct boundaries at which data leaves
the control of the user. Hence, we introduce a new control
element on each of these gateways, the Privacy Enforcement
Point (PEP). The PEP acts as a representative of the user
and allows her to remain in control over security and
privacy requirements regarding her data, even if it leaves the
protected home network and is outsourced to the potentially
untrusted cloud. In order to achieve this goal, the PEP has
to fulfill three tasks, which we present in the following.
1) Data Protection: As a basis for privacy enforcement
mechanisms, we need a security infrastructure, which offers
the basic data protection functionalities access control and
Figure 2. We introduce Privacy Enforcement Points (PEP), which encrypt data before sending it to the cloud. A Service provides a Privacy Policy (PP),
Data Usage Monitoring (M), and Audit information (A) to a trusted third-party (TPP). The TPP reviews the information from the service and suggests
default Privacy Configurations (PC) to the user, who reviews these on her Interface (I) and finally instructs her PEP to give the service access to her data.
encryption. For this, we leverage the data protection and
access control mechanisms of the SensorCloud security
architecture [3], [4], [7]. Before any data is uploaded to the
cloud, the PEP encrypts it using a symmetric data protection
key. This protects the confidentiality of the data and prevents
unauthorized access. In order to give an authorized cloud ser-
vice access to the data, the PEP encrypts the data protection
key with the public key of the cloud service and uploads
it to the cloud. Then, the cloud service may decrypt the
data protection key using its private key and, subsequently,
decrypt the data it is authorized to access, too. In order to
allow more fine-grained access control, data can be split into
data fields that are encrypted separately, and data protection
keys may be exchanged periodically, which allows to restrict
access to certain periods of time.
2) Annotation Enforcement: In Section III, we have dis-
cussed that privacy requirements do not only consist of
access to data but also impose restrictions on where data
is transferred to. The PEP allows the user to annotate her
data with such requirements [10], [31] and subsequently
enforces them. The user might, e.g., specify that certain data
might not leave her network at all, other data might only be
forwarded to specified cloud offers, while a third group of
data might be transferred to arbitrary cloud solutions. Thus,
the PEP will, based on the annotation, decide whether data
is allowed to leave the controlled network and if so, only
forward the data to those parts of a cloud that have been
authorized by the user to receive these data.
3) Flexible Access Control: As discussed in Section III,
we have to account for a trade-off between privacy and
other goods. In a medical emergency, e.g., the user would
probably be willing to give up her privacy completely if this
helps to save her life. However, the fixed and predefined
access control mechanisms as presented in Section V-A1
prevent this. Hence, we have to support Flexible Access
Control in UPECSI. For this, we extend the access control
mechanisms to support an automatic authorization of cloud
services based on internally and externally triggered events.
Internally triggered events originate from one of the net-
works of the user and could, e.g., be triggered based on the
measurements of an IoT device. Contrary, externally trig-
gered events originate from outside the user’s networks and
are typically triggered by a trusted third party, e.g., a health
professional or emergency center. Also, the combination of
internally and externally triggered events is possible, e.g., an
emergency doctor is only allowed access to the user’s data,
if his statement that the user is unconscious is consistent
with readings from the user’s vital signs monitoring device.
The user defines upfront who should get access to her data
resp. who makes that decision when an event is triggered.
For example, she could choose that any emergency doctor
gets access to her data in case of a medical emergency.
B. Model-driven Privacy
Considering privacy during service development requires
additional effort from the service developers and potentially
leads to more complexity. One approach to reduce complex-
ity and ease the developer’s job is to rise the abstraction of
the programming language. The model-driven development
(MDD) approach [32] proposes to use models instead of
general purpose programming language code, which are then
used to generate parts of the software [33]. The applicability
of MDD has been shown in various contexts, ranging from
cloud computing [18] to security and access control [34],
[35]. However, all these approaches do not address privacy
considerations.
As part of UPECSI, we introduce the Privacy Devel-
opment Language (PDL) in order to allow cloud service
developers to describe their privacy considerations while at
the same time having object oriented programming elements
like classes and methods. This way, we interconnect the
service’s data model and privacy description during service
development. PDL can be used to automatically generate the
implementation specific part of a service’s privacy policy and
data use monitoring. To realize PDL, we extend UML/P [36],
a developer-friendly version of UML for modeling data
structures and methods in a Java-like syntax.
Following Pearson’s “top six” for software engineers [15],
we identified Privacy Policy, Monitoring Data Usage, and
Audit Data Processing as mandatory for services to meet
users’ privacy demands. These measures are highly depen-
dent on the data structures and methods used within the
class Camera {
<<use="Determine where to display image in house
overview map.">>
Room location;
<<mandatory="Analysis.healthCritical">>
<<optional="Analysis.getPersonalizedAd">>
List<Person> recognizedPersons;
VideoData stream;
}
class Analysis {
<<use="Determine whether resident is alone and
needs help.">>
boolean healthCritical();
<<use="Ad funded service">>
<<notUsed="Fee is $1 per Month">>
Ad getPersonalizedAd();
}
Listing 1. Example PDL domain model
service. We use the information modeled in PDL to auto-
matically derive the privacy policy and monitoring of data
usage. Following, we describe the generation of these parts
from the PDL and the course of auditing data processing.
1) Privacy Policy: Commonly, a privacy policy is com-
posed of service specific information and general liability
disclaimers, required for every service and provided by the
legal division. As noted before, the service-specific infor-
mation is often very vague, due to the lack of more precise
information from developers. With the PDL, information on
the usage of user data is available, so that the service-specific
part of the privacy policy can be automatically derived.
Listing 1 shows a PDL model written by a service devel-
oper. For each attribute, i.e., customer data originating from
an IoT device, the service developer has to specify the use of
customer data within the service with the use stereotype.
Along with the class and attribute name, this information
allows to express data usage in a detailed, human-readable
way. We defer the discussion on how this information can
be perceived by inexperienced users to Section V-C.
In order to allow the user to customize the functionality
of a service to her privacy requirements, methods can be
declared as mandatory or optional using the respective
stereotype. Hence, each optional stereotype indicates
a user-choice in the privacy policy. In case the service
functionality changes if a method is disabled by the user, the
consequences have to be specified in human-readable form
in the notUsed stereotype. For example, with the method
getPersonalizedAd() in Listing 1 the user has two
options 1.) let the service use the list of recognized persons
for an ad-funded service, or 2.) pay $1 per month. Hence,
for each optional method, the user has to choose between
the two mutually exclusive options use and notUsed.
2) Monitoring Data Usage: In order to provide trans-
parency over the access to data, we propose a database layer
monitoring data access in addition to the fine-grained access
control as described in Section V-A3. The provider of the
cloud platform logs every data access to an attribute with
a use stereotype, i.e., all customer data. The log data is
cryptographically protected to provide confidentiality and
integrity, i.e., only the owner of the data being accessed
can view the log, and no one can tamper with the log, as it
has a public-key signature of a trusted third-party. This way,
the user may, at any time, retrieve a detailed statement on
which method accessed which parts of her data, at which
time, and for which purpose.
3) Audit Data Processing: In order to take a profound
privacy decision, the user needs to be sure that the individual
parts of a service only use her data in the way described in
use. However, a typical user (cf. Section II) does not have
the ability to verify this by herself. Hence, a trusted auditor,
e.g., the provider of the cloud platform or a certification
authority, has to verify the data usage. As the data use
description is connected to the implementing method, the
auditor can efficiently perform a detailed review, as he can
directly focus on the privacy relevant methods of the service
and is aware of their expected behavior. Reviewing the
application-specific flexible access control implementation,
the auditor ensures that policies like the emergency doctor
example in Section V-A3 in deed rely on the trusted third
party. The provider of the cloud platform will only make
those services available to the user, which have successfully
been audited. Thus, the user is ensured that the service
actually uses her data only as specified in the privacy policy.
C. Interaction with the User
In order to realize notice and consent, user interaction with
UPECSI requires special consideration. When referring to
the use cases of Section II, we must consider that UPECSI’s
approach to privacy may be applicable to users of different
levels of privacy expertise, ranging from privacy experts able
to make informed decisions up to absolutely IoT-privacy
laymen – like our 75-years-old widowed female retiree.
Therefore, technically speaking, a user considered as an
IoT-privacy expert may use her interface to read on the most
detailed scale through the generated privacy policy of every
service she uses. In this context, the decision which options
to choose from the privacy policy or which data to submit
to the service, respectively, is stored as a user’s privacy
configuration on the PEP. Contrary, default privacy settings
at different layers of abstraction are provided by various
kinds of trusted third-parties to support IoT-privacy laymen
in their decisions about privacy configurations. Although
using a default policy, the user optionally may still change
individual settings in her privacy configuration. By offering
such interaction possibilities, the user is continuously as-
sured control and verifiability of her data regardless of her
factual privacy-related technical expertise.
In order to establish trust in the data usage of the services,
users rely on the verdict of an auditor. Users may decide in
advance which information should be revealed to any medi-
cal personnel in case of emergencies. Here as well, there is
an institution which guarantees that only certified personnel
is granted access under specified emergency conditions.
Hence, from a sociology of information perspective,
UPECSI rests upon context-specific norms constraining what
information is collected, as well as with whom and under
what conditions information is shared [37]. Thus, the system
highlights not only a technical but also a social, i.e., situated
and collective, context [38]. Finally, we consider this a useful
approach to maximize transparency [39] of the whole system
which will foster users’ trust in UPECSI.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we discussed privacy concerns and consid-
erations which hinder IoT and cloud computing federation
from both end-users’ and service providers’ perspective.
To tackle these critical concerns, we presented UPECSI
as an approach for user-driven privacy enforcement for
cloud-based services in the IoT. Our main focus rested on
presenting its technical foundations with its three pillars
privacy enforcement points, model-driven privacy, and user
interaction. Its configurability on different layers of abstrac-
tion minimizes critical privacy concerns of different user
groups and helps to increase user acceptance promoting
UPECSI’s adoption in further application areas.
In the future, we will further validate the feasibility of
our proposed solution. For this, we are currently working
on prototypes for the three pillars of UPECSI. To spur its
development process, UPECSI’s future technical build-up
will be tied to feedback loops of our participatory design
approach [5]. In doing so, we incorporate different interest
groups such as end-users, service providers, experts, as well
as other stakeholders and empower them as active members
of technology development to increase user acceptance.
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